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Published in: Israel Journal of Health Policy Research 1/2015

Open Access 01-12-2015 | Commentary

The redesign of the medical intern assignment mechanism in Israel

Authors: Alvin E Roth, Ran I Shorrer

Published in: Israel Journal of Health Policy Research | Issue 1/2015

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Abstract

A collaboration of medical professionals with economists and computer scientists involved in “market design” had led to the redesign of the clearinghouse assigning medical students to internships in Israel. The new mechanism presents significant efficiency gains relative to the previous one, and almost all students get a better chance of getting what they want. Continued monitoring of the new mechanism is required to verify that it is not abused, and explore whether it can be improved. Other organizations in Israel may also be able to profit from the experience that accumulates from market design, both in Israel and abroad.
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Metadata
Title
The redesign of the medical intern assignment mechanism in Israel
Authors
Alvin E Roth
Ran I Shorrer
Publication date
01-12-2015
Publisher
BioMed Central
Published in
Israel Journal of Health Policy Research / Issue 1/2015
Electronic ISSN: 2045-4015
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1186/s13584-015-0014-y

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