Skip to main content
Top
Published in: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 3/2019

Open Access 01-09-2019 | Scientific Contribution

A non-ideal authenticity-based conceptualization of personal autonomy

Author: Jesper Ahlin Marceta

Published in: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy | Issue 3/2019

Login to get access

Abstract

Respect for autonomy is a central moral principle in bioethics. The concept of autonomy can be construed in various ways. Under the non-ideal conceptualization proposed by Beauchamp and Childress, everyday choices of generally competent persons are autonomous to the extent that they are intentional and are made with understanding and without controlling influences. It is sometimes suggested that authenticity is important to personal autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents otherwise autonomous persons from making autonomous decisions. Building from Beauchamp and Childress’s theory, this article develops a non-ideal authenticity-based conceptualization of personal autonomy. Factors that indicate inauthentic decision-making are explicated, and the full concept is defended from three expected objections. The theory is then tested on a paradigm case which has concerned theorists and practitioners for some time, namely the possible inauthenticity of anorexia nervosa patients’ decision-making. It is concluded that the theory seems to be fruitful in analyses of the degree of autonomy of patients’ decision-making, and that it succeeds in providing reliable action-guidance in practical contexts.
Footnotes
1
One possible exception is Swanson, who argues that a non-ideal conceptualization of autonomy should include “a consistent sense of personal identity” (2017, pp. 51–53).
 
2
The example with the pedophilic desires is not hypothetical; this happened to an otherwise normally functioning adult man. See Burns and Swerdlow (2003) and the below.
 
3
This proposal builds on Ahlin (2018b) but includes other kinds of persons and desires. In Ahlin (2018b), persons that are known to wish to adhere to the prevailing social and moral standards and desires that are seriously undesirable according to those standards are justifiably targeted by judgments of inauthenticity. I will not elaborate further on this difference here.
 
4
It may also be noted that desires can be inauthentic although the available empirical evidence does not suffice for observers to be justified in making that judgment.
 
5
For a more in-depth discussion of how underdetermined moral concepts should be applied in practical contexts, see Beauchamp and Rauprich (2016).
 
6
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer of an earlier version of this article for pointing this out.
 
7
1 stone = 14 lb = 6.4 kg.
 
8
Citation 6 reflects that Amy’s decision may have been non-autonomous to some extent also in the sense that she had limited decision-making capabilities, but it is beyond the present purposes to elaborate on this observation.
 
Literature
go back to reference Ahlin, J. 2018a. The Impossibility of Reliably Determining the Authenticity of Desires: Implications for Informed Consent. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 21 (1): 43–50.CrossRef Ahlin, J. 2018a. The Impossibility of Reliably Determining the Authenticity of Desires: Implications for Informed Consent. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 21 (1): 43–50.CrossRef
go back to reference American Psychiatric Association. 2013. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.CrossRef American Psychiatric Association. 2013. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.CrossRef
go back to reference Beauchamp, T. L., and J. F. Childress. 2013. Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Beauchamp, T. L., and J. F. Childress. 2013. Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
go back to reference Beauchamp, T. L., and O. Rauprich. 2016. Principlism. In Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics, ed. H. ten Have, 2282–2293. Berlin: Springer.CrossRef Beauchamp, T. L., and O. Rauprich. 2016. Principlism. In Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics, ed. H. ten Have, 2282–2293. Berlin: Springer.CrossRef
go back to reference Buchanan, A. E., and D. W. Brock. 1990. Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Buchanan, A. E., and D. W. Brock. 1990. Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
go back to reference Burns, J. M., and R. H. Swerdlow. 2003. Right Orbitofrontal Tumor with Pedophilia Symptom and Constructional Apraxia Sign. Archives of Neurology 60 (3): 437–440.CrossRef Burns, J. M., and R. H. Swerdlow. 2003. Right Orbitofrontal Tumor with Pedophilia Symptom and Constructional Apraxia Sign. Archives of Neurology 60 (3): 437–440.CrossRef
go back to reference Christman, J. 2009. The Politics of Persons: Individual Autonomy and Socio-historical Selves. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Christman, J. 2009. The Politics of Persons: Individual Autonomy and Socio-historical Selves. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
go back to reference DeGrazia, D. 2005. Human Identity and Bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef DeGrazia, D. 2005. Human Identity and Bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
go back to reference Dworkin, G. 1988. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Dworkin, G. 1988. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
go back to reference Frankfurt, H. 1971. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1): 5–20.CrossRef Frankfurt, H. 1971. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1): 5–20.CrossRef
go back to reference Hope, P. T., D. J. O. A. Tan, D. A. Stewart, and P. R. Fitzpatrick. 2011. Anorexia Nervosa and the Language of Authenticity. Hastings Center Report 41 (6): 19 – 29.CrossRef Hope, P. T., D. J. O. A. Tan, D. A. Stewart, and P. R. Fitzpatrick. 2011. Anorexia Nervosa and the Language of Authenticity. Hastings Center Report 41 (6): 19 – 29.CrossRef
go back to reference Juth, N. 2005. Genetic Information—Values and Rights. The Morality of Presymptomatic Genetic Testing. Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis. Juth, N. 2005. Genetic InformationValues and Rights. The Morality of Presymptomatic Genetic Testing. Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis.
go back to reference Lester, R. J. 2009. Brokering Authenticity Borderline Personality Disorder and the Ethics of Care in an American Eating Disorder Clinic. Current Anthropology 50 (3): 281–302.CrossRef Lester, R. J. 2009. Brokering Authenticity Borderline Personality Disorder and the Ethics of Care in an American Eating Disorder Clinic. Current Anthropology 50 (3): 281–302.CrossRef
go back to reference Noggle, R. 2005. Autonomy and the Paradox of Self-Creation: Infinite Regresses, Finite Selves, and the Limits of Authenticity. In Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, ed. J. S. Taylor, 87–108. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Noggle, R. 2005. Autonomy and the Paradox of Self-Creation: Infinite Regresses, Finite Selves, and the Limits of Authenticity. In Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, ed. J. S. Taylor, 87–108. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
go back to reference Sacks, O. 1985. The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat: and Other Clinical Tales. New York: Touchstone Books. Sacks, O. 1985. The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat: and Other Clinical Tales. New York: Touchstone Books.
go back to reference Sjöstrand, M., and N. Juth. 2014. Authenticity and Psychiatric Disorder: Does Autonomy of Personal Preferences Matter? Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (1): 115–122.CrossRef Sjöstrand, M., and N. Juth. 2014. Authenticity and Psychiatric Disorder: Does Autonomy of Personal Preferences Matter? Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (1): 115–122.CrossRef
go back to reference Swanson, K. R. G. 2017. Non-Ideal Autonomy in Relationships of Care. (Doctoral thesis), University of Minnesota. Swanson, K. R. G. 2017. Non-Ideal Autonomy in Relationships of Care. (Doctoral thesis), University of Minnesota.
go back to reference Swindell, J. S. 2009. Two Types of Autonomy. The American Journal of Bioethics 9 (1): 52–53.CrossRef Swindell, J. S. 2009. Two Types of Autonomy. The American Journal of Bioethics 9 (1): 52–53.CrossRef
go back to reference Tan, D. J. O. A., P. T. Hope, D. A. Stewart, and P. R. Fitzpatrick. 2006. Competence to Make Treatment Decisions in Anorexia Nervosa: Thinking Processes and Values. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology: PPP 13 (4): 267–282.CrossRef Tan, D. J. O. A., P. T. Hope, D. A. Stewart, and P. R. Fitzpatrick. 2006. Competence to Make Treatment Decisions in Anorexia Nervosa: Thinking Processes and Values. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology: PPP 13 (4): 267–282.CrossRef
go back to reference Taylor, J. S. 2005. Introduction. In Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, ed. J. S. Taylor, 1–29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Taylor, J. S. 2005. Introduction. In Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, ed. J. S. Taylor, 1–29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
go back to reference Valentini, L. 2012. Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map. Philosophy Compass 7 (9): 654–664.CrossRef Valentini, L. 2012. Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map. Philosophy Compass 7 (9): 654–664.CrossRef
go back to reference White, L. 2018. The Need for Authenticity-Based Autonomy in Medical Ethics. HealthCare Ethics Committee Forum 30 (3): 191–209. White, L. 2018. The Need for Authenticity-Based Autonomy in Medical Ethics. HealthCare Ethics Committee Forum 30 (3): 191–209.
Metadata
Title
A non-ideal authenticity-based conceptualization of personal autonomy
Author
Jesper Ahlin Marceta
Publication date
01-09-2019
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Published in
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy / Issue 3/2019
Print ISSN: 1386-7423
Electronic ISSN: 1572-8633
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-018-9879-1

Other articles of this Issue 3/2019

Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 3/2019 Go to the issue