Skip to main content
Top
Published in: Health Economics Review 1/2018

Open Access 01-12-2018 | Research

Regret-sensitive treatment decisions

Authors: Yoichiro Fujii, Yusuke Osaki

Published in: Health Economics Review | Issue 1/2018

Login to get access

Abstract

The threshold approach to medical decision-making, in which treatment decisions are made based on whether the probability of sickness exceeds a predetermined threshold, was introduced by (Pauker and Kassirer, N Engl J Med 293:229-234, 1975) and (Pauker and Kassirer, N Engl J Med 302:1109-1116, 1980). This study generalizes the threshold approach using regret theory. Regret theory is one of the established alternatives to expected utility theory (EUT), and partly overcomes the descriptive limitations of EUT. Under regret theory, agents suffer disutility from regret or enjoy utility from rejoicing by comparing the chosen alternative with the forgone one. We examine the effect of regret and rejoicing on the threshold approach by setting the EU case as a benchmark, and show conditions under which regret and rejoicing monotonically change the threshold probability. The threshold probability is lowered by regret and rejoicing under the reasonable condition in the sense that the condition can explain observed choices that EU fails to describe. This suggests that agents opt to undergo medical treatment by the feeling of regret and rejoicing. This result might explain the social problems that occur in relation to the public provision of medical services in many OECD countries such as medical expenditure rising faster than government forecasts. The results also imply that regret sensitivity might cause inequality of benefits from public medical services. Finally, we offer a solution to this problem.
Appendix
Available only for authorised users
Footnotes
1
Comprehensive surveys of medical decision-making were undertaken by Eeckhoudt [12] and Felder and Mayrhofer [13]. Djulbegovic et al. [14] present a review of recent developments in the treatment threshold approach.
 
2
Although we adopt “regret theory” in accordance with this custom, the name may be misleading because we must keep in mind that rejoicing is also included in regret theory.
 
3
We have borrowed the word “bold” from Bleichrodt and Wakker [15].
 
4
Bleichrodt and Wakker [15] provide an excellent survey of the development of regret theory.
 
5
A series of studies and other related literature are included in the references therein.
 
6
In this approach, ranges of sickness probabilities are determined, in which people feel regret below specified levels by undergoing medical treatment.
 
7
As noted in Hozo and Djulbegovic [8] (p. 542), “the complexity of modelling negative regret values and nonlinear value functions in a medical setting makes this original economic definition of regret difficult to apply.”
 
8
Since the threshold probabilities based on both EUT and the linear regret function coincide, earlier studies needed to adopt a different approach such as acceptable regret.
 
9
The regret utility function is cardinal in the sense that it is unique up to the affine transformation.
 
10
Because we do not consider any optimization problems in our analysis, no regularity conditions for optimality are necessary.
 
11
The regret-sensitive utility function also corresponds to EUT when the regret–rejoicing function is linear.
 
12
In general, treatment decisions are not necessarily made by the agent. Decisions might be taken by his/her family, his/her general practitioner (GP), or someone else.
 
13
The health outcome is measured in QALYs for ease of exposition. We can adapt any other variables if the health outcome is measurable and unidimensional.
 
14
may be positive when regret sensitivity is sufficiently large.
 
15
If is less than, we obtain the same statement by reversing either of the conditions.
 
16
For ease of exposition, we consider the situation in which an agent decides whether to visit a specialist or not. The same explanation can be applied to other situations by changing roles. For example, an agent goes to see a GP, and the GP makes the decision to refer the agent to a specialist or not.
 
17
The threshold probability is 0.25 when is about 1.12.
 
18
The Obamacare was reviewed under Trump administration.
 
19
A formal argument is presented in the Appendix.
 
20
The actual costs are equal to the sum of the medical expenses and subsidies.
 
21
Money and time are evaluated in terms of QALYs.
 
Literature
1.
go back to reference Pauker S, Kassirer J. Therapeutic decision making: a cost-benefit analysis. N Engl J Med. 1975;293(5):229–34.CrossRefPubMed Pauker S, Kassirer J. Therapeutic decision making: a cost-benefit analysis. N Engl J Med. 1975;293(5):229–34.CrossRefPubMed
2.
go back to reference Pauker S, Kassirer J. The threshold approach to clinical decision making. N Engl J Med. 1980;302(20):1109–16.CrossRefPubMed Pauker S, Kassirer J. The threshold approach to clinical decision making. N Engl J Med. 1980;302(20):1109–16.CrossRefPubMed
3.
go back to reference Allais M. Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l’Ecole Americaine. Econometrica. 1953;21(4):503–46.CrossRef Allais M. Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l’Ecole Americaine. Econometrica. 1953;21(4):503–46.CrossRef
4.
go back to reference Kahneman D, Tversky A. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica. 1979;47(2):263–91.CrossRef Kahneman D, Tversky A. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica. 1979;47(2):263–91.CrossRef
5.
go back to reference Bell D. Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Oper Res. 1982;30(5):961–81.CrossRef Bell D. Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Oper Res. 1982;30(5):961–81.CrossRef
6.
go back to reference Loomes G, Sugden R. Regret theory: an alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty. Econ J. 1982;92(368):805–24.CrossRef Loomes G, Sugden R. Regret theory: an alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty. Econ J. 1982;92(368):805–24.CrossRef
7.
go back to reference Djulbegovic B, Hozo I, Schwartz A, McMasters KM. Acceptable regret in medical decision making. Med Hypotheses. 1999;53(3):253–9.CrossRefPubMed Djulbegovic B, Hozo I, Schwartz A, McMasters KM. Acceptable regret in medical decision making. Med Hypotheses. 1999;53(3):253–9.CrossRefPubMed
8.
go back to reference Hozo I, Djulbegovic B. When is diagnostic testing inappropriate or irrational? Acceptable regret approach. Med Decis Mak. 2008;28(4):540–53.CrossRef Hozo I, Djulbegovic B. When is diagnostic testing inappropriate or irrational? Acceptable regret approach. Med Decis Mak. 2008;28(4):540–53.CrossRef
9.
go back to reference Felder S, Mayrhofer T. Risk preferences: consequences for test and treatment threholds and optimal cutoffs. Med Decis Mak. 2014;34(1):33–41.CrossRef Felder S, Mayrhofer T. Risk preferences: consequences for test and treatment threholds and optimal cutoffs. Med Decis Mak. 2014;34(1):33–41.CrossRef
10.
go back to reference Braun M, Muermann A. The impact of regret on the demand for insurance. J Risk Insur. 2004;71(4):737–67.CrossRef Braun M, Muermann A. The impact of regret on the demand for insurance. J Risk Insur. 2004;71(4):737–67.CrossRef
11.
go back to reference Bleichrodt H, Cillo A, Diecidue E. A quantitative measurement of regret theory. Manag Sci. 2010;56(1):161–75.CrossRef Bleichrodt H, Cillo A, Diecidue E. A quantitative measurement of regret theory. Manag Sci. 2010;56(1):161–75.CrossRef
12.
13.
go back to reference Felder S, Mayrhofer T. Medical decision making: a health economic primer. Berlin: Springer; 2011.CrossRef Felder S, Mayrhofer T. Medical decision making: a health economic primer. Berlin: Springer; 2011.CrossRef
14.
go back to reference Djulbegovic B, Ende J, Hamm RM, Mayrhofer T, Hozo I, Pauker SG. When is rational to order a diagnostic test, or prescribe treatment: the threshold model as an explanation of practice variation. Eur J Clin Investig. 2015;45(5):485–93.CrossRef Djulbegovic B, Ende J, Hamm RM, Mayrhofer T, Hozo I, Pauker SG. When is rational to order a diagnostic test, or prescribe treatment: the threshold model as an explanation of practice variation. Eur J Clin Investig. 2015;45(5):485–93.CrossRef
15.
go back to reference Bleichrodt H, Wakker PP. Regret theory: a bold alternative to the alternatives. Econ J. 2015;125(583):493–532.CrossRef Bleichrodt H, Wakker PP. Regret theory: a bold alternative to the alternatives. Econ J. 2015;125(583):493–532.CrossRef
Metadata
Title
Regret-sensitive treatment decisions
Authors
Yoichiro Fujii
Yusuke Osaki
Publication date
01-12-2018
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Published in
Health Economics Review / Issue 1/2018
Electronic ISSN: 2191-1991
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1186/s13561-018-0198-2

Other articles of this Issue 1/2018

Health Economics Review 1/2018 Go to the issue