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Published in: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 4/2021

Open Access 01-12-2021 | Scientific Contribution

The case for biotechnological exceptionalism

Author: Jan-Hendrik Heinrichs

Published in: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy | Issue 4/2021

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Abstract

Do biomedical interventions raise special moral concerns? A rising number of prominent authors claim that at least in the case of biomedical enhancement they do not. Treating biomedical enhancements different from non-biomedical ones, they claim, amounts to unjustified biomedical exceptionalism. This article vindicates the familiar thesis that biomedical enhancement raises specific concerns. Taking a close look at the argumentative strategy against biomedical exceptionalism and provides counterexamples showing that the biomedical mode of interventions raises concerns not relevant otherwise. In particular, biomedical interventions throughout raise concerns of informed consent, which only rarely turn up in comparable non-biomedical interventions.
Footnotes
1
For a detailed discussion of this ethical parity thesis see for example (Heinrichs 2017).
 
2
Buchanan refutes arguments based on human nature as well as the idea of change to the human gene pool in (Buchanan 2009). Both the reference to human nature and to playing god can be seen as placeholder debates obscuring the underlying moral issues as discussed in (Rüther and Heinrichs 2019).
 
3
Ritalin seems not to have the effect on healthy subjects which users and proponents of enhancement claim and hope it does (Repantis et al. 2010). For the sake of the thought experiment I’ll refer to Ritalin* as a more potent enhancement-drug.
 
4
Please mind that this article does not claim that the effectiveness and side-effects of Ritalin and decreased of classroom sizes are the same. The scenario is completely hypothetical. While there is – and given the provisions for research with human participants – will be no direct empirical comparison, research into the substance and into the effect of classroom size reduction indicate that the effects and side effects are quite distinct, much to the advantage of the latter.
 
5
This is basically what Levy claims in his discussion of the example: “it cannot be because Ritalin allows us to achieve, at a lower cost, precisely the same results (in terms of academic performance and well-adjusted students) as better classrooms and more individualized teaching. If it does, then Ritalin is clearly superior: if it has the same benefits, and lower costs, then we should use it (and use the savings elsewhere, where the money is needed).“ (Levy 2007).
 
6
They might, even worse, be held together just by the similarity of the concerns they raise. I’ll return to the latter possibility later on, as it raises doubts whether my example for special moral concerns about biotechnology show anything at all.
 
7
The research tradition in question tends to use the term “sacred” value. However, the values in question are characterized by their importance and validity, not by some religious belief system into which they are embedded. That is why the term ‘absolute’ will be used in this article.
 
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Metadata
Title
The case for biotechnological exceptionalism
Author
Jan-Hendrik Heinrichs
Publication date
01-12-2021
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Published in
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy / Issue 4/2021
Print ISSN: 1386-7423
Electronic ISSN: 1572-8633
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-021-10032-5

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