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Open Access 01-06-2021 | Scientific Contribution

Is human enhancement intrinsically bad?

Author: Karolina Kudlek

Published in: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy | Issue 2/2021

Abstract

A pertinent concern in the human enhancement debate is that human enhancement technologies (HET) are intrinsically bad and, hence, morally impermissible. This article evaluates the related claims about the intrinsic badness of HET by looking into philosophical theories of intrinsic value. It investigates how well-established conceptions of intrinsic value map onto typical bioconservative arguments about HET's intrinsic badness. Three predominant variants of these arguments are explored and found wanting: (i) HET are intrinsically bad owing to their unnaturalness; (ii) the pursuit of HET reveals intrinsically bad character (“the desire for mastery”); and (iii) HET will necessarily undermine intrinsically valuable things (e.g., human dignity). My analysis shows that the debate on intrinsic value places serious constraints on claims about the intrinsic badness of HET. More specifically, the analysis shows that bioconservative arguments are, for the most part, inconsistent, misconceived, and overly speculative. Enhancement interventions cannot be bearers of intrinsic value on any of its plausible understandings, and, even if we could grant such a possibility, there are no compelling reasons to presume that the intrinsic value of HET would be necessarily negative. As a result, claims regarding their moral impermissibility are unwarranted.

Although bioconservatives claim that human enhancement technologies are intrinsically bad, it seems odd to think of technologies like medical machines or pills as bad in themselves. Hence, I will assume that bioconservatives believe human enhancement as an action, brought about by biotechnological means, is intrinsically bad. Henceforth, I will use the terms HET and human enhancement as roughly amounting to the described intervention.

Some scholars may think that this formulation of the bioconservative thesis does not represent bioconservative views accurately. Milder interpretations of their views include “a general plea for caution” or simply a suggestion that “implementing HET is unwise”, but with no repercussions for its moral permissibility (e.g., Hauskeller 2013). I, however, believe that bioconservative views are too robust and influential to be taken lightly.

My analysis is limited to the evaluation of intrinsic badness of HET from the perspective of philosophical theories of intrinsic value and the evaluation of internal consistency of bioconservative arguments. As the anonymous reviewer for this journal rightly noted, there are other approaches that could be taken here. Many terms used in the intrinsic value discussion (e.g., nature, dignity, intrinsic badness, etc.) are borrowed from the rich tradition of natural law reasoning or Aristotelian metaphysics school (see, e.g., Murphy 2019). Although natural law theory may offer valuable insights on this subject, my mode of argument follows the cited authors and is analytical philosophy. For a discussion on biotechnologies and natural law see, e.g., Anderson and Tollefsen (2008); for some theological aspects see, e.g., Boer and Fischer (2013).

The traditional distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value maps onto my concerns about intrinsic and contingent reasons for or against HE. I prefer using the term ‘contingent’ because I do not think any knock-on consequences or implications are necessary except for those that follow from intrinsic properties.

By ‘consequences’ I understand a broad range of effects that are necessarily or contingently brought about by enhancement. They include affecting societal values like justice, rights, and virtue, practical aspects like distribution and regulation, as well as welfare/states of affairs. I will touch upon the relevance of the contingent impermissibility thesis in the last section.

Here, I follow Douglas’ reading of the bioconservative thesis: “[e]ven if it were technically possible and legally permissible for people to engage in biomedical enhancement, it would not be morally permissible for them to do so” (2008, p. 228).

One could also endorse a weaker version of the intrinsic impermissibility thesis stating that intrinsic badness of a practice p provides a strong reason against p’s permissibility. Even if this is the case, my conclusions apply.

Negative intrinsic value has the same meaning as intrinsic disvalue or intrinsic badness.

As I mentioned, it does not seem reasonable to think of biomedical means/technologies like medical machines or pills as bad in themselves. Also, equating HE with the end result of the process imposes the risk of normative ladenness. Namely, this entails that enhancement makes us better off by definition—if an intervention does not make us better off, it cannot be considered enhancement. As far as our goal is the evaluation of the intervention as such, we should refrain from equating human enhancement with its end result.

Some scholars warn that to ascribe intrinsic goodness to something is not to say that it is valued for its own sake, but that it has goodness in itself—it refers to the source of goodness rather than the way we value it in (Korsgaard 1983).

As Kagan explains, “if something does have value as an end, then there is reason to ‘promote’ it, to try to produce the valuable object, or perhaps to preserve and maintain it; we sometimes say that the world is better off ‘as such’ for the existence of the valuable object” (1998, p. 279). We can assume that the opposite applies to objects with negative intrinsic value: we should not try to produce, preserve and maintain them, and the world seems worse off ‘as such’ for their existence.

Also, certain skills that are instrumentally valuable could be valued in themselves—an ability such as superb cooking could be valued even if one never gets to exercise it—but its intrinsic value depends in part upon its usefulness. For a list of such relational properties and detailed examples, see Kagan (1998).

Some things have no value—they are neither good nor bad, positive nor negative (Timmons 2012, p. 8).

For a detailed discussion on degrees of intrinsic value and its computability, see, for example, Zimmerman (2001) Chapter 5.

For a detailed analysis of Moore’s isolation test, see, for example, Zimmerman (2001), Chapter 5.

By contrast, if a thing is not good in any and all circumstances, its goodness is extrinsic—derived from or dependent upon circumstances (Korsgaard 1983, p. 171).

All-purpose goods such as memory, intelligence, patience, empathy, and morality, “are traits that are valuable regardless of which kind of life a person chooses to live—valuable on all plausible conceptions of well-being” (Savulescu et al. 2011, p. 11). Also, things that have necessary value (such as all-purpose goods) may be a relevant target of this discussion, but I engage with this later.

This point is in line with the instrumentalist approach—a predominant view in philosophy of technology which sees technologies as neutral means for achieving human goals (as opposed to substantivism which gives technologies a deterministic role in society) (Borgmann 1984).

Thus, unless the improvement of cognition is valuable despite scenarios where it makes a person worse off, this action is not intrinsically valuable. Conversely, we would have to show that intrinsic disvalue is present even when an intervention is perfectly safe and makes someone better off in a relevant way.

Perhaps the most reasonable thing to assume from a conceptual point of view is that HET are neither good nor bad, but neutral.

This categorization approximately corresponds to the object, intention, and circumstances relevant for evaluating morality of a human act. In its strict sense, intrinsic badness is only applicable to the object (such as the one in the first concern). However, the other two variants aim to identify potential objects of intrinsic value within bioconservative concerns and inspect how that corresponds with standard interpretations of intrinsic value.

The concept of human nature used here equates nature with physicality or biology. It is sometimes possible to distinguish between physical and metaphysical aspects of human nature. However, it is not in the scope of my paper to engage with those views.

The idea of preserving the natural and human nature is paradoxical because these things are constantly changing and enhancements can become essential for preserving the status quo (Harris 2007; Buchanan 2011). Also, it is erroneous to think that most enhancements would change human nature since this would require a modification of a central trait on a population level (Daniels 2009). I will therefore focus on challenges prompted by the debate on intrinsic value.

I will address specific aspects of necessary consequences caused by intrinsic properties of HET, as well as their relational properties, later in the article.

This issue will be addressed in more detail under the third concern.

Actual mastery and the desire for mastery are two distinct concepts (Kamm 2005). It is improbable that actual mastery (absolute control over nature, including human nature) is attainable because while most enhancements involve changes in an individual’s nature, they do not have the potential to overthrow human nature entirely (Daniels 2009).

Some scholars also suggested we could master nature as a side effect, without desiring it as an end (Kamm 2005, p. 6).

I address this further later in the paper.

If the exact target is radical transhumanism, then the argument is inapplicable to all enhancements, since most entail minor to moderate changes.

Kagan’s example of such a causal property is the capacity of a racing car to perform at a particular speed. We might think the car is intrinsically valuable in virtue of its relational properties, including its causal properties (1998, p. 284).

It is important to distinguish between necessarily having/generating bad consequences and contingently generating consequences that are themselves necessarily bad. What I mean here is the former.

Other examples of intrinsically valuable things threatened by enhancements include humility, spontaneity, the mystery of life, openness to the unbidden, human flourishing, etc. Hauskeller explains this concern in greater detail by claiming that attempts to make better people seem to be detrimental to humility, a virtue that Sandel highly values. Hence, the main concern is the harm we might inflict on ourselves as enhancers, by allowing the reign of our inherent drive to mastery (Hauskeller 2013, p. 167). Harm, however, is not a question of intrinsic value.

Factor X is a combination of qualities such as “the possession of moral choice, or reason, or language, or sociability, or sentience, or emotions, or consciousness, or any other quality that has been put forth as a ground for human dignity” coming together in a whole (Fukuyama 2002, p. 171).

For example, Kamm (2005) argued that valuable things promoted by enhancements (e.g., health, virtue, beauty) are not incompatible with other things valued in themselves (e.g., spontaneity, giftedness, human flourishing). The deterministic effect of enhancements was challenged by Savulescu (2009, 2010), Buchanan (2011), and Lindsay (2012). Some weak points of the argument from giftedness were analyzed by Hauskeller (2013).

A similar idea comes from Kamm, as she suggests that in accounting for the permissibility of an act: “[w]e will have to decide whether particular changes are permissible independently of the aims, attitudes, and dispositions of agents who act” (2005, p. 7).

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Title: Is human enhancement intrinsically bad?
Author: Karolina Kudlek
Publication date: 01-06-2021
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Published in: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy / Issue 2/2021
Print ISSN: 1386-7423
Electronic ISSN: 1572-8633
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-021-10003-w

At a glance: The STEP trials

Springer Medicine

Is human enhancement intrinsically bad?

Abstract

At a glance: The STEP trials

Springer Medicine

Abstract

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