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Published in: Journal of Gambling Studies 4/2018

Open Access 01-12-2018 | Original Paper

Unclaimed Prize Information Biases Perceptions of Winning in Scratch Card Gambling

Authors: Alexander C. Walker, Madison Stange, Jonathan A. Fugelsang, Derek J. Koehler, Mike J. Dixon

Published in: Journal of Gambling Studies | Issue 4/2018

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Abstract

Unclaimed prize information (i.e., the number of prizes still available to be won) is information commonly provided to scratch card gamblers. However, unless the number of tickets remaining to be purchased is also provided, this information is uninformative. Despite its lack of utility in assisting gamblers in choosing the most favourable type of scratch card to play, we hypothesized that unclaimed prize information would bias participants’ judgments within a scratch card gambling context. In Experiment 1 (N = 201), we showed that participants are influenced by this information such that they felt more likely to win, were more excited to play, and preferred to hypothetically purchase more of the scratch card with the greatest number of unclaimed prizes. In Experiment 2 (N = 201), we attempted to ameliorate this bias by providing participants with the number of tickets remaining to be purchased and equating the payback percentages of all three games. The bias, although attenuated, still persisted in these conditions. Finally, in Experiment 3 (N = 200), we manipulated the hypothetical scratch cards such that games with the highest number of unclaimed prizes were the least favourable, and vice versa. As in Experiment 2, participants still favoured cards with greater numbers of unclaimed prizes. Possible mechanisms underlying this bias are discussed. In conclusion, across three experiments, we demonstrate that salient unclaimed prize information is capable of exerting a strong effect over judgments related to scratch card games.
Footnotes
1
With non-naïve participants removed, the overall repeated measures ANOVA revealed no main effect of unclaimed prize information on likelihood of winning judgments, F(1.48, 226.23) = 1.53, p = .221, \(\eta _{p}^{2}\) = .010. However, the likelihood of winning judgments for both non-naïve and naïve participants exhibited the same relationship across the levels of unclaimed prizes (e.g. highest likelihood of winning judgments for the highest unclaimed prize level; lowest likelihood of winning judgments for the lowest unclaimed prize level).
 
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Metadata
Title
Unclaimed Prize Information Biases Perceptions of Winning in Scratch Card Gambling
Authors
Alexander C. Walker
Madison Stange
Jonathan A. Fugelsang
Derek J. Koehler
Mike J. Dixon
Publication date
01-12-2018
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Journal of Gambling Studies / Issue 4/2018
Electronic ISSN: 1573-3602
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10899-018-9770-2

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