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International Journal of Health Economics and Management

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01-06-2017 | Research Article

Rationing in health care provision: a welfare approach

Authors: Laura Levaggi, Rosella Levaggi

Published in: International Journal of Health Economics and Management | Issue 2/2017

Abstract

We study the welfare properties of direct restrictions based on cost-effectiveness and indirect methods represented by waiting lists in a public health care system. Health care is supplied for free by the public health sector, but patients can choose to address their demand elsewhere by stipulating a private health care insurance policy to avoid restrictions. Our model shows that if the individual response to treatment is independent of income and cannot be observed by the patient, the choice of opting out simply depends on income, and the redistributive effects of both instruments are quite similar. In general, restrictions may only improve welfare of relatively rich individuals, usually those that opt out of the public health care system. From a policy point of view, our model casts serious doubts upon the use of these instruments for redistributive purposes.

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To simplify the model, we assume that one unit is sufficient to treat the patient.

For example, an active principle that reduces blood pressure might be less effective if used with other drugs, i.e. for classes of patients with multiple diseases.

It derives from several characteristics: a greater opportunity cost of leisure and work time spent in bad health, a greater concern for their physical strength.

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Title: Rationing in health care provision: a welfare approach
Authors: Laura Levaggi
Rosella Levaggi
Publication date: 01-06-2017
Publisher: Springer US
Published in: International Journal of Health Economics and Management / Issue 2/2017
Print ISSN: 2199-9023
Electronic ISSN: 2199-9031
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-016-9209-1

ACC 2024 Congress

Springer Medicine

Rationing in health care provision: a welfare approach

Abstract

ACC 2024 Congress

Springer Medicine

Abstract

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