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Published in: Neuroethics 2/2018

Open Access 01-07-2018 | Brief Communication

Is the Personal Identity Debate a “Threat” to Neurosurgical Patients? A Reply to Müller et al.

Author: Sven Nyholm

Published in: Neuroethics | Issue 2/2018

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Abstract

In their article in this journal, Sabine Müller, Merlin Bittlinger, and Henrik Walter launch a sweeping attack against what they call the “personal identity debate” as it relates to patients treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). In this critique offered by Müller et al., the personal identity debate is said to: (a) be metaphysical in a problematic way, (b) constitute a threat to patients, and (c) use “vague” and “contradictory” statements from patients and their families as direct evidence for metaphysical theories. In this response, I critically evaluate Müller et al.’s argument, with a special focus on these three just-mentioned aspects of their discussion. My conclusion is that Müller et al.’s overall argument is problematic. It overgeneralizes criticisms that may apply to some, but certainly not to all, contributions to what they call the personal identity-debate. Moreover, it rests on a problematic conception of what much of this debate is about. Nor is Müller et al.’s overall argument fair in its assessment of the methodology used by most participants in the debate. For these reasons, we should be skeptical of Müller et al.’s claim that the “personal identity debate” is a “threat to neurosurgical patients”.
Footnotes
1
Understood in this way, metaphysics is largely independent of ethics. At least this must be how Müller et al. understand metaphysics since they say that the participants in the personal identity debate take metaphysical ideas, apply these to DBS-patients, and then, after that, make ethical arguments on this metaphysical basis [1].
 
2
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
 
3
Müller et al. themselves also express the opinion that there can be certain limits to when it makes sense to honor advance directives.
 
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Metadata
Title
Is the Personal Identity Debate a “Threat” to Neurosurgical Patients? A Reply to Müller et al.
Author
Sven Nyholm
Publication date
01-07-2018
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Published in
Neuroethics / Issue 2/2018
Print ISSN: 1874-5490
Electronic ISSN: 1874-5504
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-017-9337-4

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