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Published in: BMC Health Services Research 1/2015

Open Access 01-06-2015 | Research article

Evasion of “mandatory” social health insurance for the formal sector: evidence from Lao PDR

Authors: Sarah Alkenbrack, Kara Hanson, Magnus Lindelow

Published in: BMC Health Services Research | Issue 1/2015

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Abstract

Background

In the last decade, almost every low- or middle-income country in the world has expressed support for universal health coverage (UHC). While at the beginning of the UHC movement, country strategies focused on increasing access to the formal sector as the first step of UHC, there is now consensus that countries should cover the entire population, with particular attention to covering the poor. However, it is often assumed that mandatory schemes will automatically cover their target populations, and consequently little is known about why firms comply or do not comply with enrolment requirements.
Using the experience of Lao PDR, where the enrolment rate in the mandatory social security scheme is low and the capacity for regulation is weak, we conducted this study to better understand the determinants of enrolment of private sector firms in mandatory social security.

Methods

We used a cross-sectional case-comparison design, surveying 130 firms. We applied a structured questionnaire to explore determinants of enrolment, specifically looking at firm characteristics (e.g., industry category, ownership); sociodemographic characteristics of company heads; firms’ risk perceptions; details of employment contracts; employee benefits; and exposure to social security. Closed ended questions were analysed quantitatively, while content analysis was applied to open-ended questions. Logistic regression was used to examine the determinants of enrolment.

Results

Smaller privately owned firms in the services industry were the least likely to enrol in social security, while firms in the trade industry were more likely to enrol than firms in manufacturing, construction, or services. The main reason for not enrolling was that firms offered a better package of benefits to their employees, although further investigation of company benefits showed that this was not the case in practice. Additional reasons for non-compliance were lack of knowledge and poor quality of care at government hospitals.

Conclusions

The study contributes to the dialogue on how best to increase coverage in the formal sector, which is an important element of achieving UHC. It also provides much needed information about the motivation of private sector firms to comply with mandatory schemes.
Footnotes
1
Employees and employers contribute 4.5 and 5 % of employees’ salaries, respectively, up to an income ceiling of LAK 1,500,000 ($175.00). Health insurance makes up the largest fund, comprising 4.4 out of 9.5 percentage points of an employee’s earnings.
 
2
Less than 30 % of targeted firms are enrolled but only a subsample of firms in the country have been targeted given the way the SSO identifies and contacts its target group. The SHI scheme covered approximately 1.5 % of the population at the time of the study.
 
3
Probability weights were calculated as the inverse of the sampling probability multiplied by the response rate, i.e., (# in the population/# in the sample) X (# sampled/# refused + # sampled). Thus, the weights act as an inflation factor to restore the strata in the sample to their respective proportions in the sampling frame.
 
4
The low response rate was expected given previous difficulty of interviewing private sector employers in Laos and because the initial point of contact was through telephone.
 
5
In this sample, all but one state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or partially state-owned enterprises were enrolled in social security. Therefore, the effect of state-ownership on enrollment is very strong. It is not clear whether there is an additional mechanism for SOEs to enroll in social security, but it is possible that SOEs are pressured to enroll or are automatically enrolled.
 
6
It was suspected that there was some collinearity between nationality and education and between nationality and ownership. However, tests for collinearity were performed in Stata and all variance inflation factors were low (below four). Following guidance in the UCLA Stata help guide, a value lower than 10 is tolerated. Another model was run without the Lao national dummy variable but the significance of other variables did not change. Thus, nationality was left in the model.
 
7
The possible factors affecting enrolment/non-enrolment were identified by first asking employers to list their most important reasons for enrolling/not enrolling. Respondents were then asked to rank the full list of responses.
 
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Metadata
Title
Evasion of “mandatory” social health insurance for the formal sector: evidence from Lao PDR
Authors
Sarah Alkenbrack
Kara Hanson
Magnus Lindelow
Publication date
01-06-2015
Publisher
BioMed Central
Published in
BMC Health Services Research / Issue 1/2015
Electronic ISSN: 1472-6963
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-015-1132-5

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