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Published in: Health Care Analysis 1/2011

Open Access 01-03-2011 | Original Paper

Can “Giving Preference to My Patients” be Explained as a Role Related Duty in Public Health Care Systems?

Author: Søren Holm

Published in: Health Care Analysis | Issue 1/2011

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Abstract

Most of us have two strong intuitions (or sets of intuitions) in relation to fairness in health care systems that are funded by public money, whether through taxation or compulsory insurance. The first intuition is that such a system has to treat patients (and other users) fairly, equitably, impartially, justly and without discrimination. The second intuition is that doctors, nurses and other health care professionals are allowed to, and may even in some cases be obligated to give preference to the interests of their particular patients or clients over the interests of other patients or clients of the system. These two intuitions are in potential conflict. One of the most obvious ways in which to ensure impartiality in a health care system is to require impartiality of all actors in the system, i.e. to give health care professionals a duty to treat everyone impartially and to deny them the ‘right’ to give their patients preferential treatment. And one of the possible side-effects of allowing individual health care professionals to give preference to ‘their clients’ is to create inequality in health care. This paper explores the conflict and proposes that it can be right to give preference to ‘your’ patients in certain circumstances.
Footnotes
1
We probably have many more intuitions about such health care systems but they are irrelevant for the topic discussed in this article.
 
2
We should, however note that it is generally assumed in health care economics and in the priority setting debate that it is acceptable to trade off equality against effectiveness/efficiency.
 
3
In the following I will use the terms “health care professional” to cover all kinds of health care professionals and “patients” to cover all those they treat or care for. In certain contexts I will also use the term “provider” to denote health care professionals who directly interact with and provide care and treatment to patients. In this paper a “provider” is therefore always a person and not an organisation.
 
4
”…, at jeg stedse vil bære lige samvittighedsfuld omsorg for den fattige som for den rige uden persons anseelse,…” Det Danske Lægeløfte 1815 http://​www.​laeger.​dk/​portal/​page/​portal/​LAEGERDK/​LAEGER_​DK/​LAEGEFAGLIGT/​RET_​OG_​ETIK/​ETIK/​LAEGELOEFTET.
 
5
This dictum is attributed to Jeremy Bentham by Mill [1]. It does not occur in Bentham’s English language writings.
 
6
For an insightful discussion of this issue see Jeske and Fumerton [2].
 
7
Furrow [3].
 
8
Whether it is actually true that boxing does this is outside the scope of this paper, but let us note that if we did not believe that boxing actualised some good we would have no reason to allow boxing and outlaw the brawl outside the pub.
 
9
In his book “Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) Arthur I. Applbaum argues in Chapter 5 that the answer to the question ‘Are Lawyers Liars?’ must be ‘Yes’ in adversarial systems on any ordinary understanding of lying.
 
10
Remember that the time of the health care professional is also a resource so the ‘no resource constraint’ situation may be fairly rare, but it does occur. If there is only one patient in the waiting room towards the end of the day and the indicated treatment is removal of earwax there may well be no resource constraints on this particular interaction. The fact that the system could possibly have allocated the health care professional’s time more efficiently does not alter this.
 
11
Holm [4].
 
12
Lipsky [5].
 
13
Bærøe [6].
 
Literature
1.
go back to reference Mill, J. S. (1969). Utilitarianism. In J. M. Robson (Ed.), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Vol. 10, p. 257). Toronto, London: Oxford University Press. Mill, J. S. (1969). Utilitarianism. In J. M. Robson (Ed.), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Vol. 10, p. 257). Toronto, London: Oxford University Press.
2.
go back to reference Jeske, D., & Fumerton, R. (1997). Relatives and relativism. Philosophical Studies, 87, 143–157.CrossRef Jeske, D., & Fumerton, R. (1997). Relatives and relativism. Philosophical Studies, 87, 143–157.CrossRef
3.
go back to reference Furrow, B. R. (2009). Health law and bioethics. In V. Ravitsky, A. Fiester, & A. L. Caplan (Eds.), The penn center guide to bioethics (pp. 33–45). New York: Springer. Furrow, B. R. (2009). Health law and bioethics. In V. Ravitsky, A. Fiester, & A. L. Caplan (Eds.), The penn center guide to bioethics (pp. 33–45). New York: Springer.
4.
go back to reference Holm, S. (1998). Goodbye to the simple solutions: the second phase of priority setting in health care. BMJ, 317(7164), 1000–1002. Holm, S. (1998). Goodbye to the simple solutions: the second phase of priority setting in health care. BMJ, 317(7164), 1000–1002.
5.
go back to reference Lipsky, M. (1990). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Lipsky, M. (1990). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
6.
go back to reference Bærøe, K. (2009). Priority-setting in healthcare: A framework for reasonable clinical judgements. Journal of Medical Ethics, 35, 488–496.CrossRefPubMed Bærøe, K. (2009). Priority-setting in healthcare: A framework for reasonable clinical judgements. Journal of Medical Ethics, 35, 488–496.CrossRefPubMed
Metadata
Title
Can “Giving Preference to My Patients” be Explained as a Role Related Duty in Public Health Care Systems?
Author
Søren Holm
Publication date
01-03-2011
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Health Care Analysis / Issue 1/2011
Print ISSN: 1065-3058
Electronic ISSN: 1573-3394
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10728-010-0164-6

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