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In Praise of the Commons: Another Case Study

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Abstract

Common-pool allocation systems do not have the best of reputations in economic literature, since they are normally connected with the dissipation of rents. The present case study argues that in the case of procurement and allocation of human organ transplants a reciprocal common-pool allocation system is superior other systems, including market allocation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Gerhard Mercator University Duisburg, 47048, Duisburg, Germany

    Manfred Tietzel

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  1. Manfred Tietzel
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Tietzel, M. In Praise of the Commons: Another Case Study. European Journal of Law and Economics 12, 159–171 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012898305987

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012898305987

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