Abstract
Following the thought of G.W.F. Hegel, this article attempts to look at “human dignity” as a particular form of vulnerability – a symbolic vulnerability, which has its roots in a desire for recognition. My reflections follow two objectives, the starting point for both of which is Hegel’s “struggle to death”. (1) What does it mean to speak of “dignity” in terms of vulnerability? It means to look at human dignity not as worth or as a strength, but rather as a specific fragility. For Hegel, the longing for recognition implies a dependency on recognition. This dependency may even go so far that human beings accept being insulted. Thus, a person may be recognized so little that an act of humiliation is taken as an act of recognition. From the viewpoint of an autonomy-perspective on human dignity, this openness for humiliation might itself appear to be humiliating. This paradox is discussed by contrasting two readings of Hegel: one which brings him closer to Kant, and one which refers to Judith Butler’s account of recognition. (2) My second objective is to point to the symbolic dimension of violations of human dignity. This “rituality” of humiliation has its roots in the symbolic dimension of recognition. In recent social theories, the “act of recognition” is spelled out in symbolic terms: To be recognized is to be addressed by the other. This is the reason why not only acts of recognition but also acts of misrecognition, and of humiliation, have a constitutive symbolic dimension. We can indeed be humiliated by simple words. But even mere violence can have a certain ritual dimension – and it is perhaps this very dimension that constitutes its humiliating force.
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Notes
- 1.
In this, I am following a suggestion made by Ernst Tugendhat in “Self-consciousness and Self-determination” (1986: 306).
- 2.
Margalit clearly points to the peril of any notion of dignity. He writes that any trait with which one tries to justify respect for human beings “[…] must not be of the sort that it can be abused – namely, that it can provide a reason for abhorrence or disrespect” (Margalit 1996: 62).
- 3.
Although I am obviously following Margalit and his conception of self-respect to a certain extent here, it is not at all clear how he understands the relation between recognition (or respect) and self-respect. Margalit even seems to question the importance of recognition: “Why should other people’s recognition be important to one’s self-respect? After all, we are not talking about a person’s self-esteem, which must be validated through interaction with others. Self-respect, in contrast to self-esteem, is the honor a person grants herself solely on the basis of the awareness that she is human” (Margalit 1996: 24). But later, his argument is, quite on the contrary, that self-respect ultimately depends on social contexts because this context is necessary to make it possible for someone to articulate a concept of the human which everyone needs in order to be able to see himself as human. And Margalit coins this social context in terms of recognition: He states that the “skeptical justification for respecting human beings is rooted in the fact that we all recognize one another as part of humanity and for this reason and this reason alone we deserve respect” (Margalit 1996: 124, my emphasis).
- 4.
In recognition theory, there is an ongoing debate between an “attributive” (or “productive”) approach to recognition which argues that certain beings are formed or constituted (or at least constituted as selves) in recognition dynamics, and a “receptive” (or “reproductive”) approach which assumes that recognition is the acknowledging of an antecedent value or characteristic (see Honneth 2007: 331–332).
- 5.
Of course, we cannot satisfy all demands for recognition. There is a difference between the basic demand for being recognized as equal being and demands for being recognized in one’s special qualities and merits. While the former principle of recognition is (or should be) distributed equally and universally, the latter is distributed differentially and unevenly (see Honneth 1995: 92).
- 6.
There are, however, cases that may look at first sight like examples of humiliations (in the sense of a loss of recognition) but that turn out, after a closer look, to be examples of a loss of self-control (i.e., as a restriction of autonomy). If we take a look at a racist insult, for example, we may assume that the insulted person knows that the expression was a mere insult and that it is not true, but nevertheless may feel humiliated – and this may be mainly because of the fact that he or she is not able to meet the challenge and throw back another, equally humiliating insult. That is to say that the insult as such may not be humiliating, but the inability to return the challenge actually is. “Our humiliation consists, at least in part, in the particular sort of powerlessness that not answering the challenge represents – weakness, cowardice, lack of wit etc.” (Silver et al. 1986: 273). In other words: In this perspective, it would not be the loss of recognition that is humiliating but the loss of autonomy. Yet I think this objection overestimates the dimension of autonomy here. The problem in the example is not so much the loss of control but the specific content of what is said about the insulted person. Of course, experiencing a loss of self-control is a bad thing, but this experience would have been a lot less bad if the insult had been a mere personal insult against some individual weak point.
- 7.
- 8.
Although Margalit is one important philosopher amongst others who have introduced the idea of a symbolic vulnerability, he does not really tell us why human beings are vulnerable in this specific sense. Margalit just gives a vague reference to the work of Ernst Cassirer (Margalit 1996: 85). Why doesn’t he connect the question of symbolic vulnerability to his idea that the constitution of self-respect depends on a normative social context (Margalit 1996: 124)? What is even more difficult is the problem that Margalit is rather vague about the idea of humiliation as symbolic cruelty itself. In fact, later on in his “Decent Society,” he seems to associate the impact of humiliations with the threat to the physiological life of the affected person: “The existential threat implicit in the humiliation must be taken seriously, but not the humiliation itself. The victim has no reason to see any flaw in human value, but only a danger to his existence, or to his basic human condition” (Margalit 1996: 123).
- 9.
Although Honneth’s argument aims at a different direction, he involuntarily supports my argument when saying that “material fulfillments” should “lead to modes of behavior that give real expression to the actual value articulated in the original act” (Honneth 2007: 345, my emphasis). In his discussion with Nancy Fraser, Honneth argues that the societal distribution of goods is not opposed to the cultural sphere of recognition, but instead one part of it. In other words, the distribution of goods is itself a medium of the social expression of esteem (Honneth 2003: 150–159).
- 10.
This example again sheds light on Hegel’s “struggle to death”. Of course, this struggle might have suggested that humans always put their autonomy or their recognition above their physiological life – or in other words: that recognition is more fundamental than life. Yet I think it only shows that human beings are able to put their recognition above their life; but that neither means that they always actually are willing to risk their life or to commit suicide, nor that they should do this, nor that recognition as such is more fundamental than life. Besides, I have tacitly criticized Hegel and his whole narrative of the struggle because of its heroic undertone, while I have, at the same time, tried to save his idea of the importance of recognition
- 11.
I am indebted to the helpful notes of Steffen Herrmann.
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Kuch, H. (2011). The Rituality of Humiliation: Exploring Symbolic Vulnerability. In: Kaufmann, P., Kuch, H., Neuhaeuser, C., Webster, E. (eds) Humiliation, Degradation, Dehumanization. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 24. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9661-6_4
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