Dying for Others: Family, Altruism, and a Duty to Die

Abstract

John Hardwig’s article, “Is There a Duty to Die?” places the family in a central role in the decision of whether or not a family member has a duty to die. His main criteria for whether such a duty prevails is, briefly, whether we will be a burden on our loved ones. Ironically, it is his insistence on making this a family decision that gives rise to serious problems. The difficulties arise when we consider how a scenario might play out under Hardwig’s proposal.

Using one of Hardwig’s own examples, this chapter explores the scenario and argues for two conclusions. One is that there are serious, although not fatal, problems with his employment of altruism in the duty to die decision-making process. The other, which is more serious, questions whether we might consider a family that decided one of its members had a duty to die morally blameworthy. Even if we did not, we would still encounter problems when the family informed their loved one that he or she had a duty to die. Is it proper for a family member to ask another to die, or is such a duty more akin to a debt of gratitude, which one might be owed, but it would be improper to demand the gratitude?

In the final analysis, this chapter concludes that the practical application of Hardwig’s conception of a duty to die has problems that raise the question concerning whether his proposal is feasible at all.